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1. Introduction 
The VAT currently continues to spread in the countries worldwide taxing 
transactions in goods and services. This leads in turn to the growing risks of both 
tax avoidance and tax evasion, and also of double taxation in the absence of 
appropriate international VAT coordination. Consequently, the administering of 
VAT becomes more complicated when cross-border transactions occur and more 
than one jurisdiction could apply its own VAT rules.  
The low level of VAT administering, particularly, could cause the VAT 
frauds in the cross-border trade. 
So, the main purpose of this paper is to analyze both current problems, related 
to the cross-border VAT fraud and measures to tackle them. To do this we 
structured paper as follows. Section 2 reviews recent theoretical and empirical 
research on the VAT frauds in cross-border trade in goods. Section 3 provides brief 
theoretical analysis of VAT in international trade. Section 4 examines current 
problems in the cross-border VAT fraud and main strategies to tackle them. 
Finally, Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.  
2. Literature review 
Keen and Smith (2007) described the main forms of noncompliance 
distinctive to a VAT and considered how they can be addressed, and assesses 
evidence on their extent in high-income countries. Fedeli & Forte (2009) examined 
VAT frauds at the EU States’ borders by modeling some different collusive 
characters of these frauds in order to explore their effects on the international trade 
and the domestic market.  
Mesdom (2011) estimated fair destination-based VAT. He concluded that 
border adjustments are easier to administer for tangible goods than for services and 
to achieve fair results, some proxies for services will be necessary. Magnusson 
(2009) analyzed the VAT fraud in cross-border trade from the point of view of 
institutional theory, notably, by involving routines and norms. The author 
explained the VAT fraud by applying three causal variables – motivated offenders, 
the crime opportunity structure and the absence of effective guardians of law and 
order, or in other words, effective control structure, where the crime opportunity 
structure and control activities – as well as norms, values and attitudes affect the 
motive formation of the individuals in a social psychological process. 
He concluded that information and endeavors to influence the attitudes and motive 
formation of the people who are committing the VAT fraud in cross-border trade. 
Bukhsh and Weigand (2014) discussed VAT frauds scenarios in the cross-
border trade and possible prevention approaches. Walpole (2014) analyzed various 
anti-fraud measures and he concluded that those that encourage VAT compliance 
and reduce the VAT burden on compliant businesses could be regarded as 
preferred options. Gradeva (2014) estimated empirically the VAT evasion in cross-
border trade in the context of intra-EU trade flows from the EU-15 to seven of the 
new Eastern European EU member states, notably, the responsiveness of the trade 
gap to changes in the VAT rate for the time period of 2004-2009 at the six-digit 
product level. She found that the trade gap is positively correlated with the VAT 
rate in three of the seven Eastern European countries. 
3. Theoretical background  
According to OECD (2015), the destination vs. origin principle is one of the 
fundamental issues of trade policy in relation to the international application of the 
VAT.  
Under the destination principle, VAT is levied only on the final consumption 
occurred within the taxing jurisdiction. Under the origin principle, the tax is levied 
in the various jurisdictions where the value was added. The key economic 
difference between the two principles is that the destination principle places all 
firms competing in a given jurisdiction on an even footing whereas the origin 
principle places consumers in different jurisdictions on an even footing.  
Moreover, the application of the destination principle in VAT achieves 
neutrality in international trade, since exports are not subject to tax with refund of 
input taxes (that is, “free of VAT” or “zero-rated”) and imports are taxed on the 
same basis and at the same rates as domestic supplies.  
By contrast, under the origin principle each jurisdiction would tax the value 
created within its own borders and exporting jurisdictions would tax exports on the 
same basis and at the same rate as domestic supplies, while importing jurisdictions 
would give a credit against their own VAT for the hypothetical tax that would have 
been paid at the importing jurisdiction’s own rate.  
This would run counter to the core features of a VAT: as a consumption tax. 
And the origin principle could distort the economic or geographical structure of the 
value chain and violate neutrality in international trade. For these reasons, there is 
widespread consensus that the destination principle is preferable to the origin 
principle from both a theoretical and practical standpoint. This is the international 
norm and is sanctioned by WTO rules. 
In some detail, implementation of the destination principle with respect to 
international trade in goods is relatively straightforward in theory and generally 
effective in practice, due in large part to the existence of border controls or fiscal 
frontiers. The VAT on imports is generally collected at the same time as customs 
duties, although in some jurisdictions collection is postponed until declared on the 
importer’s next VAT return. Allowing deduction of the VAT incurred at 
importation in the same way as input tax deduction on a domestic supply ensures 
neutrality and limits distortions in relation to international trade [9, pp. 12-13]. 
According to the Mesdom (2011), choice between destination and origin principle 
has a significant impact on the avoidance of double taxation and the equal 
treatment of imports compared with locally produced goods [13, p.192]. 
There are different approaches to classify the VAT fraud in cross-border 
trade. According to the International VAT association report (2007), main sources 
of VAT fraud are the following: 
the black economy;  
insolvencies;  
missing trader fraud – including “carousel” type fraud;  
other types of fraud, notably: 
invalid deductions of input tax – false input tax invoices, or goods obtained 
for non-business use, and  
non-payment of output tax, including sales at lower than normal values [3, 
p.6,9]. 
Frauds that can arise under VAT, according to Keen & Smith (2013), are: 
under-reported sales; 
failure to register; 
misclassification of commodities; 
tax collected but not remitted; 
imported goods not brought into tax [10, p.7-9]. 
According to Bukhsh & Weigand (2014), VAT frauds can be divided into the 
following categories.  
1. Acquisition fraud, which is the simplest missing trader fraud where a 
fraudster imports some goods, assuming that these are zero-rated in the country of 
origin, and VAT is due in the country where they have been imported. Then the 
fraudster charges basic price and VAT and later fraudster become missing trader 
and does not pay VAT.  
2. Carousel fraud, which is another version of VAT fraud where missing 
trader purchases goods from a supplier located in another EU state. Then he sells 
the goods to a business and charges VAT and later the missing trader disappears 
without paying the VAT, which in turn starts a chain process where the buying 
business sells the goods to a second business and charges VAT, paying the excess 
VAT received from the second business to the budget. The last business in the 
chain sells the goods to a broker. After exporting goods in EU, broker reclaims the 
VAT on next purchase. At this time fraud is revealed that VAT is not being paid by 
the missing trader.  
3. Contra-trading fraud, under which the trader does not claim for 
reimbursement. The first broker does not submit a claim to obtain a refund of the 
VAT charged to it. Instead, he imports goods from another EU state, without 
paying VAT. This VAT charge and import goods chain continues until one broker 
or another participant of the supply chain submits a claim for a refund of input tax 
[2, p.2].  
4. Current problems related to VAT fraud and measures to tackle them 
The report of the European Court of Auditors stated that the current EU 
system for fighting cross-border VAT fraud is not effective enough and is 
hampered by a lack of comparable data and indicators. The main problems in this 
area are the following: 
absence of effective cross-checks between customs and tax data in most of the 
Member States; 
problems with the accuracy, completeness and timeliness of data despite the 
VAT information is shared between Member States' tax authorities; 
a lack of cooperation and an overlap of powers between administrative, 
judicial and law enforcement authorities [7, p.1; 15, p.9]. 
There are some main features related to the cross-border VAT fraud: 
organized crime, smuggling, money laundering and estimation problems. 
Let’s consider them briefly.  
Organized crime. VAT fraud is often linked with organized crime. According 
to Europol, €40-60 billion of the annual VAT revenue losses of Member States are 
caused by organized crime groups and that 2 % of those groups are behind 80 % of 
the VAT fraud [15, p.36]. 
Money laundering. According to the Report of FATF (2007), there are close 
links between the laundering of VAT carousel fraud and the laundering of funds 
from other serious organized crime. Due to the nature of the offence and the 
substantial scale of the profits available, VAT carousel fraud poses a serious risk of 
being a favored option to invest money from, and invest money in, other crimes, 
p.18 
In order to tackle these challenges the following measures should be done: 
providing Suspicious Transaction Reports; 
ensuring cooperation and information sharing, notably, ensuring more 
cooperation between the financial sector and public authorities to develop, 
distribute and offer feedback on indicators and profiles; 
sharing of trends and profiles internationally; 
more use of mutual assistance to help identify the money flows [11, pp.12-13; 
18]. 
Smuggling. The Eurojust meeting (2014) highlighted the fact that, in most 
cases, excise fraud and VAT fraud are linked, and constitute some of the EU’s 
biggest annual losses of revenue from unpaid duties. Consequently, the two main 
types of challenges were identified: 
legal and prosecutorial challenges: in addition to different EU legislation in 
tax and customs area, different approaches to tackle VAT fraud, excise fraud 
schemes are complex and continually evolving; 
practical challenges, notably, weaknesses in control mechanisms which make 
the origin of goods, the identity of the traders and the location of the proceeds 
difficult to determine.  
Accordingly, they analyzed such solutions as harmonization of excise tariffs 
and goods subject to excise, further training for investigatory and judicial 
authorities, the development of specialized control mechanisms and the improved 
exchange of information between Member States’ authorities. And they identified 
that the use of the judicial support is the best practice to tackle cross-border excise 
fraud effectively, which include the exchange of information facilitated through 
coordination meetings, joint action days and the establishment of joint 
investigation teams [5, pp.2-3]. 
According to the EU Report (2016), it is difficult to measure the impact of 
VAT frauds in the cross-border trade, since the compliance VAT gap is not 
a reliable estimate of intra-Community VAT fraud, because it includes not only 
both domestic and cross-border VAT fraud, but also other revenue losses, 
including those due to legal tax avoidance, traders’ insolvency and tax 
administrations’ practices of tolerating tax arrears by companies in difficulties. 
Moreover, the VAT gap is very sensitive to estimates of the grey economy that are 
included in GDP data [15, p.20]. 
The EU experts consider that the common risk analysis and an effective 
feedback mechanism would allow the network to further enhance its role as a quick 
reaction from tax administrations against cross-border VAT frauds. For the cross-
border exchange of information there are clear legal frameworks established for 
both tax and customs competent authorities [15, p.53]. 
VAT fraud particularly affects the plant/machinery sector, motor vehicles, 
soft drinks but other sectors are also involved [4, p.28].  
The analysis of current strategies aiming to reduce the possibilities of fraud 
and exclude new important fraud risks allowed us to summarize them in the Fig.1. 
OECD (2015) has elaborated main guidelines in order to achieve VAT 
neutrality in the cross-border trade. With respect to the level of taxation, foreign 
businesses should not be disadvantaged or advantaged compared to domestic 
businesses in the jurisdiction where the tax may be due or paid, p.16 
This means that there should not be any discriminatory application of the 
rules because foreign businesses should not end up having a tax advantage 
compared to domestic businesses in terms of their final tax burden. Consequently, 
the VAT should not distort competition between foreign and domestic businesses. 
To ensure foreign businesses do not incur irrecoverable VAT, jurisdictions 
may choose from a number of approaches, notably, making supplies free of VAT, 
allowing foreign businesses to obtain a refund through a specific regime, allowing 
foreign businesses to obtain a refund through local VAT registration, shifting the 
responsibility to locally registered suppliers/customers, granting purchase 
exemption certificates, etc. 
In the area of administration and compliance, where specific administrative 
requirements for foreign businesses are deemed necessary, they should not create a 
disproportionate or inappropriate compliance burden for the businesses. Domestic 
businesses and foreign businesses are in different situations in relation to the tax 
administration. The former will generally has a fixed place of business from which 
the business is operated, local employees, a local bank, local links to the tax 
authorities and various forms of identification/registration through bodies, while 
foreign businesses are less likely to have a legal presence, local staff or links 
within the local community. And this lack of presence and history in a jurisdiction 
could be regarded as an element of risk for tax administrations, for which 
appropriate measures may need to be taken to protect against evasion and 
avoidance [9, pp. 17-26]. 
Concerning the law aspects, according to the VAT expert group legal 
certainty is important for business and tax administrations alike particularly in 
cross-border scenarios in order to determine the correct place of taxation, i.e. to 
eliminate double taxation or non-taxation, to avoid VAT costs arising due to 
assessments and penalties, and to ensure the proper functioning of the single 
market and provide a level playing field [14, p.1]. 
  
 Fig. 1. Measures to tackle VAT frauds in the cross-border trade 
Source [1; 2; 3; 16] 
 
I. Economic measures 
 
1. Maintenance of tax 
neutrality. 
 
2. Use of the reverse charge 
mechanism. 
 
3. Delaying refunds of VAT. 
 
4. Establishment of an 
appropriate rate structure and 
registration threshold. 
 
5. Providing a zero rating 
exports 
 
II. Institutional measures 
 
1. Generating no 
disproportionate administrative 
burdens for traders and the 
authorities. 
 
2. Maintenance of tax 
neutrality. 
 
3. Cross-border co-operation. 
 
4. Chain liability 
MEASURES TO REDUCE POSSIBILITIES OF VAT FRAUDS  
IN THE CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN GOODS 
III. Procedural and technical measures 
1. Ensuring the non-discriminatory treatment in a Member state between 
both national operators and operators established elsewhere. 
2. Use of indicators, i.e. guidelines that may indicate VAT fraud in 
order to check them to be saved from fraud, notably, type of goods, 
speed of transaction, supply chain, payments. 
3. Extension of verification.  
4. Disruption of criminal activity.  
5. Scrutiny of new VAT registration.  
6. Real-time logging of trades and verification of counter-parties: 
7. Collection of VAT in real-time. 
8. Information exchanges and information checking. 
9. Use of VAT Locator Numbers (VLNs), under which customers 
cannot deduct input tax if the VAT is mentioned on an invoice without a 
valid VLN. 
10. Use of D-VAT certification, based on the introduction and 
implementation of certified tax software in order to calculate 
automatically the correct tax and VAT liabilities for each transaction, to 
prepare invoices for these taxes, to link each VAT input or output 
amount to the correct VAT return, and to complete the VAT return 
procedure accurately. 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis of the theoretical background of VAT in cross-border trade in 
goods allowed us to determine both some main features related to the cross-border 
VAT fraud (organized crime, smuggling, money laundering and estimation 
problems) and measures to tackle them. 
We defined, based on the evaluation of current strategies aiming to reduce the 
possibilities of cross-border VAT fraud, the three main groups of such measures, 
notably, economic measures, institutional measures and procedural and technical 
measures.  
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